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ARTICLE
PUNISHMENT FOR ECOLOGICAL DISASTERS:
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND/OR
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
LEO M. ROMERO1
INTRODUCTION
This article addresses the means of punishing conduct that causes seri-
ous environmental harm like the Exxon Valdez oil spill. In particular, it
considers the appropriateness and effectiveness of both punitive damages
and criminal sanctions as remedies in such cases in light of the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s approaches to reviewing both punitive damages awards and
criminal sentences for excessiveness. This article recommends, first, that
state legislatures should authorize and regulate punitive damages so that
appellate courts will not interfere with punitive damages awards, as hap-
pened in the Exxon case. Second, states should enforce criminal provisions
in environmental statutes against both corporate and individual offenders in
order to enhance the deterrent effect that such laws have on corporations
and their policies, and to express the moral outrage occasioned by culpable
conduct harming the environment.
Punitive damages as we have known them—based on culpable con-
duct, awarded by juries, with no limits, and subject to judicial review—
remain available as a remedy for cases like the Exxon Valdez oil spill even
after the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Exxon Shipping Co. v.
Baker.2 However, the Supreme Court’s decisions reviewing punitive dam-
1. Professor Emeritus, University of New Mexico School of Law. I wish to thank my col-
leagues at the University of New Mexico School of Law, Professors Erik Gerding and G. Emlen
Hall, for their helpful comments on drafts of this article and Dean Kevin Washburn of the Univer-
sity of New Mexico for his support of this project. Eileen Cohen, reference librarian, deserves
special thanks for her research assistance.
2. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008). The Court rejected an argument
that punitive damages were unavailable in federal maritime cases. Id. at 2618. In a more recent
case, Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, the Court affirmed the availability of punitive damages
in maritime cases. 129 S. Ct. 2561, 2565 (2009) (“Historically, punitive damages have been avail-
able and awarded in general maritime actions, including some in maintenance and cure. We find
that nothing . . . eliminates that availability.”). In addition, most states permit punitive damages as
154
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ages in the Exxon case and other cases like BMW v. Gore3 and State Farm
v. Campbell4 make this civil remedy limited and uncertain. This remedy is
limited by the proportionality concept in the Due Process Clause,5 and it is
uncertain because any jury award can be challenged and subjected to a pro-
portionality review, especially if the punitive damages award exceeds the
amount of compensatory damages, a 1:1 ratio cap of punitive damages to
compensatory damages.6 If punitive damages continue to be used to punish
reprehensible conduct with some degree of confidence that awards will not
be rejected as excessive in view of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, the
way in which punitive damages are currently imposed must change to make
it closer to the system in place for the imposition of punishment in the
criminal context.7
In order to use punitive damages, including large awards, to punish
blameworthy conduct causing serious ecological harms, and to have such
awards survive constitutional challenges, legislatures need to set limits8 and
regulate punitive damages similar to the way that legislatures have regu-
lated criminal punishment.9 If a legislature, using the criminal code model,
ranks the reprehensibility of conduct, assigns different maxima according to
the rankings, and specifies the punishment theory that justifies the amount
of authorized punitive damages, the Supreme Court likely will defer to the
legislative regulation of punitive damages. The Court will likely defer to
a civil remedy. See, e.g., DOUG RENDLEMAN, REMEDIES 15 (7th ed. 2006) (noting that all but five
states have common-law punitive damages).
3. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
4. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
5. See, e.g., id. at 416 (“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor.”).
6. In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, the Supreme Court adopted a limit on punitive damages
equal to the amount of compensatory damages—a 1:1 ratio cap in the exercise of its common law
authority to regulate federal damages in maritime cases. 128 S. Ct. at 2633. Although the decision
in this case was not based on the Due Process Clause, the Court stated in a footnote, “In this case,
then, the constitutional outer limit may well be 1:1.” Id. at 2634 n.28.
7. Several commentators have proposed that punitive damages need to be regulated similar
to the way that criminal punishment is regulated. See, e.g., Leo M. Romero, Punitive Damages,
Criminal Punishment, and Proportionality: The Importance of Legislative Limits, 41 CONN. L.
REV. 109 (2008) (proposing limits on the amount of punitive damages that juries can award);
Jeffrey L. Fisher, The Exxon Valdez Case and Regularizing Punishment, 26 ALASKA L. REV. 1
(2009) (proposing that punitive damages be regulated by legislatures similar to the way that legis-
latures have regulated criminal sentencing); Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Puni-
tive Damages as Intermediate Sanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239 (2009) [hereinafter Markel,
Retributive Damages] (proposing a restructuring of punitive damages as an intermediate sanction
between compensatory damages and criminal fines, including many features borrowed from the
system of criminal punishment). In a follow-up article, Professor Markel has proposed detailed
suggestions for how a system of retributive punitive damages should work. Dan Markel, How
Should Punitive Damages Work?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1383 (2009) [hereinafter Markel, Punitive
Damages] (proposing procedural protections for punitive damages as a retributive sanction).
8. See, e.g., Romero, supra note 7, at 113.
9. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 7, at 6; Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 7, at 248;
Markel, Punitive Damages, supra note 7, at 1435 (arguing procedural safeguards are necessary
when punitive damages are used for retribution).
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policy judgments of the legislature that certain conduct deserves to be pun-
ished by punitive damages up to the amount authorized by statute just as it
now defers to legislative determinations of the proper punishment in crimi-
nal cases.10 Legislatures can authorize and justify large punitive damages
awards in appropriate cases, and courts would respect large awards under
such a scheme.11
Criminal sanctions in lieu of, or in addition to, punitive damages12 are
also available to punish culpable defendants in cases where the misconduct
was committed with a high degree of culpability—intentionally, knowingly,
or with gross recklessness. For misconduct causing environmental injury,
criminal prosecutions should be considered against the corporation as an
entity, the offending actor, and responsible corporate individuals. Even
though a corporation cannot be imprisoned and can only be fined, the
stigma of a criminal conviction, combined with a criminal fine, may well
have a greater deterrent effect than a punitive damages award limited to a
ratio of 1:1 to compensatory damages. Likewise, for corporate officers, the
threat of a criminal conviction and a prison sentence may operate as a
greater deterrent than punitive damages against the corporation. Calculating
corporate officers may well be able to assess the cost-benefit of certain
conduct if the sanction is money, like punitive damages or a fine. Imprison-
ment, on the other hand, is not so easily reduced to an economic
calculation.
The decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Exxon limiting the amount
of punitive damages to the amount of the compensatory damages raises the
question whether punitive damages are effective and meaningful punish-
ment for misconduct that causes serious ecological harm. Critics of the de-
cision claim that the reduced punitive damages award of $507 million was
inadequate punishment for Exxon—a multi-billion dollar corporation that
made more than that amount in profit every week.13
10. See, e.g., Romero, supra note 7, at 158 (arguing that the legislative judgment about the
proper amount of punishment would likely be respected by the courts); Fisher, supra note 7, at 30
(“Indeed, it appears that the Court should afford extreme deference to such legislative
judgments.”).
11. See, e.g., Romero, supra note 7, at 158.
12. Because the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to litigation between private parties,
a defendant could be punished criminally and through punitive damages for the same conduct. See
Markel, Punitive Damages, supra note 7, at 1450–51. Nevertheless, double punishment for the
same conduct raises concerns about excessive punishment. Professor Markel suggests that puni-
tive damages, as a normative matter, should not be allowed following a criminal conviction for the
same conduct. Id. at 1454–57. He would, however, permit a criminal prosecution to follow a
punitive damages award. Id. at 1457–59. Any punitive damages award would be credited against
any fine imposed according to his proposal. Id. at 1460.
13. See, e.g., Tanya Paula de Sousa, Case Note, Oil Over Troubled Waters: Exxon Shipping
Co. v. Baker and the Supreme Court’s Determination of Punitive Damages in Maritime Law, 20
VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 247, 248 (2009) (noting that the award against Exxon represented less than a
week’s profit, just another cost of doing business); Chris Bergen, Note, Exxon Shipping Co. v.
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This section will examine the argument that the punitive damages
award of $507 million did not punish Exxon, or punish Exxon enough, for
the harm it caused as a result of the oil spill. In particular, it will address the
deterrence argument used to justify high awards without limitations like a
ratio cap. This section concludes that a deterrence rationale for setting the
amount of punitive damages is inadequate in view of the difficulty of pre-
dicting what amount is necessary to deter and prevent future misconduct.
This article proposes a different way of determining the proper amount
of punitive damages. Instead of focusing on deterrence, the amount of puni-
tive damages should be based on retributive principles that measure the
gravity of the misconduct by taking into account the culpability of the
wrongdoer and the harm caused.14 Because the determination of the gravity
of the misconduct should be made prospectively and in the context of other
wrongful conduct, legislatures should make this determination and assign
the maximum amount of punitive damages that can be awarded for different
types of misconduct.15 Legislatures need to address punitive damages in
much the same way that they have dealt with criminal punishment and exer-
cise the policy judgments that are inherent in determining what conduct
should be punished and to what extent. By regulating punitive damages,
legislatures can authorize punitive damages awards in excess of the ratio
caps imposed by the Supreme Court, and the legislative policy choice as to
the amount of deserved punishment will be respected and upheld by the
Supreme Court.16
BACKGROUND ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The Supreme Court views punitive damages as serving only one func-
tion—punishment—with no compensatory aspect.17 If compensatory dam-
ages are inadequate, punitive damages cannot be used to correct the
Baker: The Supreme Court Tightens the Purse Strings on Corporate Punitive Awards, 22 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 141, 157 (2008) (“Exxon dodged a colossal bullet.”).
14. The Supreme Court has recognized that proportionality of punishment to conduct should
be largely based on the reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct and that reprehensibility
should be assessed in view of the harm done and the recklessness or malice involved in the
misconduct. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575–76 (1996) (articulating five factors
that it considered relevant in assessing reprehensibility). The Court, however, left it to juries in the
first instance to determine in particular cases the degree of reprehensibility and the amount of a
punitive award. Id. at 568. A jury’s determination of reprehensibility is, of course, subject to
review by courts under the Due Process Clause.
15. See, e.g., Romero, supra note 7, at 157, 160; Fisher, supra note 7, at 41–42.
16. See, e.g., Romero, supra note 7, at 158 (noting that legislative caps would likely be
respected by the courts); Fisher, supra note 7, at 39 (stating that it is hard to imagine the Court
overriding a legislative assessment of proper punitive damages).
17. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2621 (2008) (“Regardless of the
alternative rationales over the years, the consensus today is that punitives are aimed not at com-
pensation but principally at retribution.”); Cooper Industries v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S.
424, 432 (2001) (explaining that punitive damages are “intended to punish the defendant and to
deter future wrongdoing”).
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inadequacy. Arguments for using punitive damages as a means of compen-
sating for harms that compensatory damages do not cover18 are no longer
viable in view of the Supreme Court’s conception of punitive damages as
solely punishment-oriented. If the total harm to the environment in an oil
spill cannot be correctly valued or compensated under tort law,19 punitive
damages can no longer be relied on to provide the missing compensation.
Any changes in the law to permit recovery for losses that are not subject to
compensation or that are difficult to calculate must be done by other means.
For example, a legislature could make changes in tort law and expand the
harms subject to compensation.20 Likewise, a legislature could authorize
extra-compensatory damages to serve societal interests other than punish-
ment and deterrence.21 In either case, the legislation would be pursuing in-
terests deserving of deference from the courts. Such non-punitive interests,
however, should not be packaged in punitive damages. Instead, these gov-
ernmental interests should be articulated separately to avoid confusion with
the purely punishment purpose of punitive damages.
Punishment in a civil lawsuit involving private parties has only re-
cently drawn the attention of the Supreme Court.22 Unlike European legal
18. See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass, Punitive Damages and Valuing Harm, 92 MINN. L. REV.
83 (2007). Professor Klass argues that the harm is undervalued in environmental harm and inten-
tional tort cases and sees punitive damages as a means of compensating those harms that are not
valued or included in compensatory damages. Id. at 86–88. The single-digit ratio of punitive
damages to compensatory damages, she claims, is too limiting in these cases, and she argues for
double-digit or high single-digit ratios in environmental harm cases. Id. at 149.
19. For examples of harm that were not compensable under maritime tort law at the time of
the Exxon Valdez oil spill, see Fisher, supra note 7, at 33 n.170 ((1) “Commercial fishermen . . .
were unable to recover for the devaluation in their fishing permits.” (2) “[F]ishermen were unable
to recover for ‘price diminishment in fisheries that were not oiled’ or ‘diminution of market value
owing to fear or stigma.’” (3) Landowners whose land was not polluted could not recover for
reductions in the market value of their land).
20. For types of harms that are not presently compensable that could be subject to recovery
by legislative authorization, see Klass, supra note 18, at 86–88; Fisher, supra note 7, at 33 n.170.
21. I would classify “societal damages” as a separate category of damages payable by a
defendant, not as a re-conceptualization of punitive damages as proposed in Catherine M.
Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 401 (2003). Professor
Sharkey sees punitive damages as furthering a societal compensation goal of redressing harms to
others besides the plaintiff in a particular case, and proposes that this goal be recognized and
furthered by using the additional damages above compensatory damages to create a pool of money
to compensate other victims who are not before the court. Id. at 353–54, 389. Professor Fisher
takes the position that a legislature could authorize societal damages as part of punitive damages.
Fisher, supra note 7, at 32–34. He believes that states should be able to pursue a number of
government interests through the vehicle of punitive damages as long as these interests have a
legislative basis. Id. at 34. I agree with his position that the state can pursue these interests if
legislatively authorized, but disagree with his position that they can be included within the concept
of punitive damages.
22. The Supreme Court’s venture into reviewing punitive damages awards began in 1989 in
the case of Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 260 (1989) (holding that
the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution does not limit civil
punitive damages, but hinting that the Due Process Clause might prohibit excessive punitive dam-
ages awards).
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systems that confine punishment to the criminal law and reject punitive
damages in private actions,23 most American jurisdictions permit punitive
damages for wrongful conduct.24 The Court has approved the practice of
awarding punitive damages in the civil context, but its approval has been
accompanied by procedural and substantive conditions.25
Because punitive damages are viewed solely as punishment, they, like
criminal sanctions, must satisfy the principles of just punishment.26 One of
these principles—that punishment must be proportional to the misconduct
being punished—has a constitutional mandate. The Supreme Court has in-
terpreted the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
to require proportionality for criminal sanctions27 and its Excessive Fines
Clause to prohibit fines that are disproportional to the wrongful conduct.28
The Supreme Court has said that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
and Fifth Amendments requires that punitive damages awards be propor-
tional to the misconduct.29
The Supreme Court has taken different approaches to reviewing pun-
ishment for proportionality in criminal sanctions and punitive damages. In
the criminal context, the Court gives almost complete deference to legisla-
tive penalties, even accepting a life sentence without parole for grand theft
under the California three-strikes law.30 In contrast, the Court accords little
23. See Helmut Koziol, Punitive Damages—A European Perspective, 68 LA. L. REV. 741,
748, 751 (2008). Some foreign courts, like those in Germany and Japan, decline to enforce puni-
tive damages judgments from American courts. See Ronald A. Brand, Punitive Damages Revis-
ited: Taking the Rationale for Non-Recognition of Foreign Judgments Too Far, 24 J.L. & COM.
181, 191 (2005).
24. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1062–66 (2000) (discussing the role of punitive
damages in American tort law).
25. Procedural requirements include adequate jury instructions that inform the jury as to the
factors to be taken into account in awarding punitive damages, see, e.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991); post-verdict judicial review by both the trial judge and appellate
courts to ensure that the award is reasonable, id. at 15; de novo review, rather than abuse of
discretion review, by the appellate courts, Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S.
424, 436 (2001); and safeguards to prevent a jury from basing a punitive damages award on
injuries to third parties other than the plaintiff, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 349,
357 (2007). The substantive condition requires that the punitive damages award be reasonable and
not excessive or disproportionate. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562, 574 (1996);
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416, 426 (2003).
26. See, e.g., Romero, supra note 7, at 113 (applying the requirements for just punishment—
notice, proportionality, and limits—to punitive damages).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983) (noting
that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment clause prohibits “sentences that are disproportionate to the
crime committed.”).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998).
29. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1; see, e.g., State Farm, 538 U.S. at 416 (“While States
possess discretion over the imposition of punitive damages, it is well established that there are
procedural and substantive constitutional limitations on these awards. The Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments
on a tortfeasor.”) (citations omitted).
30. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30–31 (2003) (plurality opinion). The plurality de-
ferred to the policy of isolating repeat offenders in California legislature’s three-strikes law, stat-
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or no deference to punitive damages awards and engages in an active pro-
portionality review to determine if the award is excessive and violates due
process.31
For evaluating punitive damages awards for excessiveness, the Su-
preme Court has adopted three guideposts.32 Using these guideposts, the
Court has rejected jury awards that it deems excessive, either under a due
process analysis in cases coming from state courts33 or by exercising its
judgment in federal common law cases.34 The punitive damages jurispru-
dence suggests that punitive damages awards, in the absence of a legislative
maximum and without legislative standards, will be subject to strict propor-
tionality review by the Court, and the Court will make an independent judg-
ment about the reasonableness or excessiveness of a particular award.35
The Court’s approach to criminal sanctions, on the other hand, reveals
an almost complete deference to the legislatively authorized criminal sen-
tence.36 Apart from capital punishment cases, the Supreme Court has up-
held all but one criminal sentence challenged as excessive.37
The difference in the way the Supreme Court treats its review of crimi-
nal punishment and punitive damages can be explained in large part by the
presence or absence of legislative limits.38 Criminal penalties have a maxi-
ing that “selecting the sentencing rationales is generally a policy choice to be made by state
legislatures, not federal courts.” Id. at 25.
31. See, e.g., Romero, supra note 7, at 114–15 (“In the area of criminal prison sentences, the
Court for the most part defers to the legislative determinations regarding the proper amount of
punishment.” However, “[i]n the area of punitive damages, where there is no legislative limit on
the size of awards, the Court has shown little deference to the jury’s determination and instead has
engaged in a search for guideposts to assess the proportionality of the award.”); Fisher, supra note
7, at 6 (“[T]he Supreme Court defers almost completely to legislative and administrative bodies
concerning the permissible length of prison sentences and even as to when capital punishment
may be imposed. There is no reason to believe that punitive damages law could not follow a
similar path.”); Pamela S. Karlan, “Pricking the Lines”: The Due Process Clause, Punitive Dam-
ages, and Criminal Punishment, 88 MINN. L. REV. 880, 920 (2004) (The Court’s decisions “with
respect to constitutional limits on sentences and damages seem at first in some tension with one
another.”).
32. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574–75 (1996) (adopting the
following guideposts: degree of reprehensibility, ratio of punitive damages to compensatory dam-
ages, and sanctions for comparable conduct).
33. See, e.g., id. (finding a punitive damages award of $2 million from Alabama to be exces-
sive); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003) (concluding that a
$145 million punitive damages award from Utah was excessive).
34. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2626 (2008) (deciding that a $2.5
billion punitive damages award was excessive in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s federal
maritime common law authority, rather than on the basis of a constitutional due process review).
35. See, e.g., Romero, supra note 7, at 139 (explaining that the Court makes its own judg-
ment regarding the reprehensibility of the conduct and whether the award is proportional).
36. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 7, at 6; Romero, supra note 7, at 139.
37. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983) (holding that a sentence of life imprisonment
without eligibility for parole was disproportionate to his crime of uttering a bad check for $100
and was therefore excessive under the Eighth Amendment).
38. See Romero, supra note 7, at 152–54. For other explanations of the different approaches
by the Supreme Court in reviewing criminal sentences and punitive damages awards, see Erwin
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mum, whereas punitive damages are open-ended with no limits. The re-
quirements for just punishment—notice, proportionality, limits, and the
absence of wide disparities in punishment for similar misconduct—apply
equally to criminal sentences and punitive damages.39 Because punitive
damages, for the most part, have not been regulated by legislatures or Con-
gress, and because juries are given no limits40 on the amount of punitive
damages they can award, large punitive damages awards will always raise a
constitutional question of proportionality.
In reviewing punitive damages awards under the Due Process Clause,
the Supreme Court adopted three guideposts to help it determine whether
the award was proportional or excessive: (1) the degree of reprehensibility
of the misconduct, (2) the ratio of the award to compensatory damages, and
(3) comparison of the award to criminal penalties for comparable miscon-
duct.41 Although it has stated that reprehensibility is the most important
guidepost,42 the Court relies primarily on the ratio to compensatory dam-
ages as the basis for determining whether the award is excessive.43 Al-
though the Court has refused to specify a ratio to mark the line between
reasonable and excessive punitive damages, the Court has signaled that a
4:1 ratio is the presumptive limit,44 that any ratio above 9:1 is constitution-
ally suspect,45 and finally, that a 1:1 ratio is the appropriate ratio in a case
with substantial compensatory damages.46
THE FACTS OF EXXON SHIPPING CO. V. BAKER (2008)
The Supreme Court adopted its 1:1 ratio in an oil spill case, exercising
its common law jurisdiction under federal maritime law. In the majority
opinion by Justice Souter, the Court reduced a punitive damages award
Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1063 (noting that the
differences in the proportionality analysis cannot be justified); Karlan, supra note 31, at 920
(“Differences between the two kinds of litigation may, however, explain why proportionality re-
view is relatively more attractive in punitive damages cases.”).
39. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 7, at 19 (arguing that the rule of law requires civil as well as
criminal punishment to be regularized).
40. The Supreme Court found jury instructions inadequate to guide juries in determining the
amount of punitive damages to award. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. at 2628 (“skepti-
cal that verbal formulations, superimposed on general jury instructions, are the best insurance
against unpredictable outliers.”).
41. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 599, 565, 574–75 (1996).
42. Id. at 575.
43. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. at 2629 (noting that a more promising way
to limit punitive damages awards is “by pegging punitive to compensatory damages using a ratio
or maximum multiple”). For an explanation of why a ratio is most attractive, see Romero, supra
note 7, at 133–34 (arguing that the ratio guidepost is the easiest to apply, the Court talks about
allowable ratios, and lower courts focus on ratios in evaluating the constitutionality of punitive
damages awards).
44. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).
45. Id.
46. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. at 2634.
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against Exxon Shipping Co. for an oil spill of 11 million gallons into Prince
William Sound. The jury had awarded $5 billion in punitive damages,47 but
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had reduced the award to $2.5 billion.48
The Supreme Court, applying a 1:1 ratio of punitive damages to compensa-
tory damages, further reduced the award to $507 million, equal to the
amount of compensatory damages.49
According to the facts as described by the Supreme Court,50 on the
night of March 23, 1989, the Exxon Valdez oil tanker ran into the Bligh
Reef. The captain of the tanker, Joseph Hazelwood, before taking command
of the tanker at 9:15 p.m., spent the day at waterfront bars drinking with the
crew and consumed at least five double vodkas. Eleven hours after the oil
spill, he had a blood alcohol reading of .061. Based on this level of alcohol
in his blood after so long a period, experts testified that he must have had a
blood alcohol level of around .241 at the time of the collision with the reef.
Hazelwood was in his cabin at the time of the collision, having left the third
mate in charge on the bridge.
Hazelwood was a relapsed alcoholic with two prior convictions for
driving while intoxicated. His driver’s license had been revoked or sus-
pended three times and remained revoked on the night of the spill. Exxon
executives knew that Hazelwood had a drinking problem. They knew that
he had completed a treatment program, dropped out of a prescribed follow-
up rehabilitation program, stopped attending Alcoholics Anonymous, and
started drinking again. Hazelwood drank with Exxon officials, but Exxon
did not monitor Hazelwood once he returned to work after completing his
alcohol treatment program.
As a result of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, civil actions were brought
seeking both compensatory and punitive damages. A civil action for envi-
ronmental harms filed by the governments of the United States and Alaska
resulted in a consent decree in which Exxon agreed to pay at least $900
million toward restoring natural resources damaged by the oil spill.51 Some
of the civil claims by private parties—fishermen, property owners, and
others—were settled for $303 million.52
The other civil claims were litigated and consolidated into three clas-
ses of plaintiffs seeking compensatory damages—commercial fishermen,
Native Alaskans, and landowners—and a mandatory class53 of all plaintiffs
(more than 32,000) seeking punitive damages.54 In the compensatory dam-
47. Id. at 2614.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 2634.
50. Id. at 2611–13.
51. Id. at 2613.
52. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. at 2613.
53. At the request of Exxon, the trial court certified a mandatory class of all plaintiffs seeking
punitive damages and dealt with punitive damages as a class action. Id.
54. Id.
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ages part of the jury trial, the commercial fishermen received $287 mil-
lion.55 The Native Alaskans class settled their claims for $20 million, and
the Native Alaskans who opted out of the class settled for $2.6 million.56
In the punitive damages phase of the trial, the jury awarded punitive
damages of $5,000 against Hazelwood and $5 billion against Exxon.57 Af-
ter several appeals, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reduced the award against Exxon to $2.5 billion;58 Exxon appealed to the
United States Supreme Court. The Court reduced the punitive damages to
$507.5 million, equal to the total compensatory damages as calculated by
the District Court.59
EXXON DECISION ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The United States Supreme Court adopted a ratio of 1:1 as the outer
limit of punitive damages in the Exxon case. Under this cap, punitive dam-
ages could not exceed the amount of the compensatory damages. Acting as
a common law court because federal courts have the power to decide mari-
time cases in the manner of a common law court unless Congress has ac-
ted,60 the Court determined what should be the proper amount of punitive
damages in this case.61 It did not engage in a due process review of the
award.62 Instead, the Court said it was regulating punitive damages in mari-
time cases as a common law remedy in the absence of a congressional stat-
ute on the subject.63
In arriving at the 1:1 ratio as the proper proportion of punitive dam-
ages for the reckless conduct of Exxon, the Supreme Court expressed con-
cerns about the unpredictability of outlier high punitive damages awards.64
Specifically, the Court expressed concerns about fairness, consistency, and
equality due to the (1) unpredictability in the amount of awards, (2) the
great spread between high and low awards due to outlier verdicts, (3) incon-
sistent awards for similar misconduct,65 and (4) the inadequacy of jury in-
55. Id. at 2614.
56. Id.
57. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. at 2614.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 2605, 2634 (relying on the calculation in In re Exxon Valdez, 236 F. Supp. 2d
1043, 1063 (D. Alaska 2002)).
60. Id. at 2619 (punitive damages in maritime law falls within a federal court’s jurisdiction to
decide in the manner of a common law court, subject to the authority of Congress to legislate
otherwise if it disagrees with the judicial result). The Court rejected Exxon’s argument that the
Clean Water Act preempted maritime common law on punitive damages. Id.
61. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. at 2626.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2626–27.
64. Id. at 2625 (the Court uses the term “outlier” to describe those awards that fall signifi-
cantly above the normal distribution of awards).
65. The Court gave as an example of inconsistent results the $4 million punitive damages
verdict by an Alabama jury in BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) and a verdict
rejecting punitive damages by a different jury in another Alabama case that involved similar facts
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structions for preventing outlier awards. However, the Court did not see any
evidence of a lot of runaway jury verdicts producing huge awards, or even a
marked increase in the percentage of cases with punitive damages awards.66
Nevertheless, the Court saw a need to regulate punitive damages to prevent
outlier awards by limiting punitive damages awards to a ratio cap of 1:1.67
It viewed excessive outlier verdicts as unfair because punishment should be
reasonably predictable and reasonably equal for similar conduct.68
To address these concerns and prevent unpredictable outlier awards,
the Supreme Court considered several options. It rejected more guidance in
jury instructions as a meaningful way of constraining outlier awards,69 pre-
ferring a quantified, more concrete approach to limiting outlier awards.70
The Court considered and rejected a dollar cap because of the difficulty of
picking a particular dollar figure appropriate for all punitive damages cases
and because of the judiciary’s inability to adjust a dollar cap for inflation.71
The Court then decided that ratio caps tied to compensatory damages would
be more promising because the effects of inflation would be left “to the jury
or judge who assesses the value of actual loss.”72 For guidance on what the
cap should be, it looked at states with caps of 1:1, 2:1, 3:1, and 5:1,73 at
federal caps like treble damages for antitrust violations,74 and at empirical
studies of jury awards that showed that the median ratio of punitive dam-
ages awards was 0.65:1 to compensatory damages.75
The Supreme Court found that the empirical studies provided the best
guidance for determining a reasonable ratio of punitive to compensatory
damages.76 The Court concluded that the median ratio of 0.65:1 “probably
and comparable compensatory damages. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. at 2626; see
also BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. at 565 n.8.
66. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. at 2624. A study in 2009 found that following
the decision in State Farm there has been a statistically significant drop in the number of punitive
damages awards of at least $100 million, their amount, and the ratio of punitive damages to
compensatory damages. Alison F. Del Rossi & W. Kip Viscusi, The Changing Landscape of
Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards (Vanderbilt University Law Sch., Law and Economics,
Working Paper No. 09-33, 2009).
67. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. at 2626–27. One study predicts that the 1:1
ratio would eliminate most of the blockbuster awards, those of at least $100 million. Rossi &
Viscusi, supra note 66.
68. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. at 2627.
69. Id. at 2628 (noting that examples of jury instructions “leave us skeptical that verbal for-
mulations . . . are the best insurance against unpredictable outliers”).
70. Id. (“[D]oubtful that anything but a quantified approach will work.”). The Court referred
to quantified limits used in sentencing guidelines and the approach taken by states that have im-
posed dollar or ratio caps. Id. at 2628–29.
71. Id. at 2629 (suggesting that courts would be unable to adjust for inflation unless the issue
of a dollar cap was presented in a future case).
72. Id. at 2629.
73. Id. at 2631.
74. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. at 2632.
75. Id. at 2633.
76. Id. at 2632.
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marks the line near which cases like Exxon should be grouped”77 and
adopted a 1:1 ratio as the outer limit for such cases.78 The Court found
comfort in the 1:1 ratio in view of the Clean Water Act’s scheme of fining
negligent pollution at up to $25,000 per day and doubling the criminal fine
up to $50,000 per day for a knowing violation.79
Critical to the Supreme Court’s adoption of the 1:1 ratio was its assess-
ment of the wrongfulness of Exxon in the oil spill and the degree of harm
caused. The Court did not view Exxon as especially culpable, since its con-
duct was unintentional and yielded no profit.80 With regard to the degree of
harm, the Court considered the injury caused by the oil spill and the com-
pensation awarded to be substantial.81 The Court left open the possibility
that it might choose a higher ratio if the conduct was intentional or done for
profit.82
EFFECTIVENESS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN DETERRING
ECOLOGICAL MISCONDUCT
The jury in the Exxon case, as well as the District Court, the Ninth
Circuit, and the three dissenters in the United States Supreme Court, consid-
ered $2.5 billion or $5 billion as the appropriate punishment for Exxon’s
misconduct of letting Hazelwood drive an oil tanker with reckless culpabil-
ity.83 They thought that a higher award in the range of 5:1 or 10:1 to com-
pensatory damages was justified in view of Exxon’s recklessness based on
77. Id. at 2633. Authors of one of the studies cited by the Court state that their empirical
studies do not support the 1:1 ratio across the broad range of compensatory awards. They state that
the ratio is reasonably stable in high compensatory award cases but much more variable in low
compensatory award cases. Theodore Eisenberg, Michael Heise & Martin T. Wells, Variability in
Punitive Damages: An Empirical Assessment of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in Exxon
Shipping Co. v. Baker, 2–3 (Cornell Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 09-
011, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1392438.
78. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. at 2633–34.
79. Id. at 2634 (stating that a 1:1 ratio essentially results in total damages double the amount
of compensatory damages).
80. Id. at 2631–33 (“We confront . . . a case of reckless action, profitless to the tortfeasor.”).
81. Id. at 2631–32. Apparently the Court was concerned that applying a ratio above 1:1 to a
large compensatory award would produce a very large punitive damages award.
82. Id. at 2631 (stating that a 3:1 ratio may be appropriate “in quite different cases involving
some of the most egregious conduct, including malicious behavior and dangerous activity carried
on for the purpose of increasing a tortfeasor’s financial gain”).
83. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. at 2614. The District Court agreed with the
jury’s verdict of $5 billion in punitive damages and each time the District Court reviewed that
award, it concluded that the award was not excessive. Id. at 2640. (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (citing In re the Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1110 (D. Alaska
2004)). On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to
the District Court twice before remitting the punitive damages award to $2.5 billion. In re Exxon
Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1246–47 (9th Cir. 2001); In re Exxon Valdez, 472 F.3d 600, 601, 625 (9th
Cir. 2006) (per curium); In re Exxon Valdez, 490 F.3d 1066, 1068 (9th Cir. 2007). Justices Ste-
vens, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented from the Supreme Court’s judgment that the $2.5 billion
award should be reduced: “I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.” Id. at 2635
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), “I would therefore affirm the opinion of the
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its knowledge of Hazelwood’s prior treatment for drinking, knowledge that
Hazelwood drank with Exxon officials, knowledge of Hazelwood’s relapse
and drinking after his treatment, and permitting Hazelwood to captain the
Exxon Valdez with this knowledge. One commentator said that the award of
$507 million due to the 1:1 cap would do little to deter a corporation like
Exxon from repeating its reckless management,84 noting that Exxon’s profit
exceeded $40 billion in 2007, and that Exxon made on average $507.5 mil-
lion every 41/2 days in 2007.85
Is there any reason for punishing Exxon for its culpable conduct be-
yond making it pay for the harm it caused with the oil spill? The Supreme
Court said that punitive damages, like criminal sanctions, serve legitimate
state interests in punishment (retribution) and deterrence. Did Exxon de-
serve to be punished? Would punitive damages serve to deter Exxon and
other oil shipping companies? The answers to these questions depend on the
amount of the award and the impact of the award on the corporation. The
answer also depends on who decides the amount of the punitive award—
jury, trial court, appellate court, Supreme Court, or a legislative body. The
jury, District Court, Court of Appeals, Supreme Court majority, and dis-
senters had different views as to the amount of punitive damages Exxon
should pay for its culpable conduct—$5 billion, $2.5 billion, or $507 mil-
lion—for retribution and deterrence.
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND DETERRENCE
Before assessing the deterrent value of punitive damages, it should be
noted that deterrence can be achieved by imposing civil liability for com-
pensatory damages. If corporations like Exxon know that they will be liable
for all of the harm caused by an oil spill to fishermen, the local economy,
and the environment, the cost of fully compensating all who suffer from a
spill should be an incentive to take preventive steps to avoid large oil spills
that will be costly to the corporation. Exxon paid $507 million in compen-
satory damages to private plaintiffs86 and $900 million to the federal and
state governments to cover their costs of cleaning up the oil spill.87 In addi-
tion, it spent approximately $2.1 billion for its efforts in cleaning up the
disaster.88 Liability for these substantial costs may provide a sufficient de-
Court of Appeals.” Id. at 2640 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), “I would
uphold it.” Id. at 2641 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
84. See Chris Bergen, Note, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker: The Supreme Court Tightens the
Purse Strings on Corporate Punitive Awards, 22 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 141, 153 (2008).
85. Id. (citing Steven Mufson, Exxon Mobil’s Profit in 2007 Tops $40 Billion, WASH. POST,
Feb. 2, 2008, at D1).
86. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. at 2634 (Court took “for granted the District
Court’s calculation of the total relevant compensatory damages at $507.5 million.”).
87. Id. at 2613.
88. In re Exxon Valdez, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1047 (D. Alaska 2002). Exxon agreed to pay
a $150 million fine, which was later reduced to $25 million plus $100 million of restitution. A
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terrence to Exxon and other oil shipping companies without the need for
punitive damages. The jury, however, as well as the District Court and
Court of Appeals, thought that punitive damages in addition to compensa-
tory damages were necessary to provide effective deterrence, an additional
incentive to prevent oil spills.
Deterrence has two aspects, specific and general. Specific deterrence
focuses on the offender and aims to discourage him from such conduct in
the future. In the case of Exxon, for example, payment of compensatory and
punitive damages should provide a financial incentive for Exxon to take
steps to avoid future oil spills. General deterrence, on the other hand, sends
a message to others. The punishment of Exxon provides an example to
other oil companies of what will happen if they engage in similar
misconduct.
The argument to juries for punitive damages often focuses solely on
specific deterrence. The claim is made that the defendant should have to
pay a sum that hurts, a sum based on its wealth that will get the attention of
the offender to take steps that will prevent a reoccurrence of the miscon-
duct.89 The argument further claims that if the award is not high enough, the
offender will dismiss the payment as the cost of business and do nothing to
prevent future misconduct.
Assessing the deterrent effect of punitive damages in the context of
environmental damage caused by corporate misconduct is difficult.90 Stud-
ies show that it is even more difficult to determine the amount of punitive
damages that will deter a corporation.91 Setting the amount of a punitive
damages award to achieve optimal deterrence so that the offender is neither
under-deterred nor over-deterred is a difficult enterprise.92 It depends on an
assessment of the impact of the award on the offender and on other poten-
tial offenders. If the amount of the award fails to change behavior, there is
under-deterrence. If an award is above that necessary to achieve prevention,
it is excessive and over-deterrence. The difficulty in knowing what is the
right amount of punitive damages to deter Exxon and other oil companies
civil action by the federal and state governments resulted in a consent decree for Exxon to pay at
least $900 million, and it paid another $303 million in voluntary settlements with private parties.
89. See, e.g., Doug Rendleman, A Plea to Reject the United States Supreme Court’s Due-
Process Review of Punitive Damages, in THE LAW OF REMEDIES: NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE COM-
MON LAW (Jeff Berryman & Rick Bigwood eds.) (forthcoming 2010), available at http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1146465.
90. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution in Punishment Theory: Doing Jus-
tice as Controlling Crime 6 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Pub. Law and Legal Theory Research Paper
Series, Research Paper No. #09-32, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1492779 (studies
suggest “that effective deterrence is possible only if the prerequisites are satisfied, but that the
prerequisites commonly are not satisfied.”). Professor Robinson identifies the prerequisites for any
deterrent effect, which he says are the exception rather than the rule. Id. at 3.
91. Id. at 4 (“There are a host of facts that make it difficult to predict and control the amount
of punishment that will be felt and remembered.”).
92. Id. at 4–5.
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from recklessly or negligently shipping oil is illustrated by the widely dif-
ferent figures determined by the jury ($5 billion), Court of Appeals ($2.5
billion), and Supreme Court majority ($507 million). Determining the mini-
mal amount of punitive damages that will induce Exxon to put measures in
place to prevent future oil spills like screening and drug testing of tanker
pilots is a difficult task. Punitive damages of $2.5 billion might be sufficient
to change Exxon’s behavior—on the other hand, maybe $100,000 would be
sufficient. Perhaps punitive damages are unnecessary and payment of the
cleanup costs of the oil spill93 and compensatory damages to all who suf-
fered loss would be sufficient deterrence. The Supreme Court’s adoption of
a 1:1 ratio in Exxon, where it said that the compensatory damages of $507
million are substantial, may reflect the notion that high compensatory dam-
ages have a significant deterrent effect and that punitive damages above a
1:1 ratio are unnecessary and over-deterrence.
The difficulty of measuring the deterrent effect of punitive damages
makes the prediction of the proper amount to deter more of a guess than a
scientific measurement. Punishment based on a deterrence theory involves a
prediction of the impact of the punishment. Predicting the effect of punish-
ment on behavior, however, is an exceedingly difficult enterprise. It is al-
most impossible to know in advance whether a particular award will have a
deterrent effect. It is not surprising that juries, judges, and parties often have
very different views of what is needed to deter. Not even a post-award eval-
uation of the corporation’s behavior provides good answers to the question
whether the punitive damages award was effective. If, after paying compen-
satory and punitive damages, Exxon and other oil companies did nothing
more to prevent oil spills, one might conclude that neither the compensatory
nor punitive damages had any deterrent effect. If, on the other hand, they
changed their policies regarding the hiring and testing of tanker captains
and changed the construction of tankers to avoid or minimize oil spills,
several conclusions are possible but none is necessarily implied by the fact
that corporate behavior changed. Perhaps the cost of compensatory damages
alone could have provided the incentive to prevent a similar oil spill. An-
other possibility is that the additional cost of punitive damages persuaded
Exxon to adopt measures to prevent and mitigate oil spills. Or maybe Ex-
xon changed its behavior because it wanted to project an image of a green
environmentally-friendly company. The difficulty of identifying the cause
of changed behavior after an offender has been ordered to compensate for
loss and to pay punitive damages illustrates the difficulty of assessing the
deterrent effect of a punitive damages award.
As problematic as the after-the-fact measurement of deterrence can be,
the prediction of a deterrent effect at the time that the amount of punish-
93. In re Exxon Valdez, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 1047 (stating that Exxon spent about $2.1 billion
to clean up the oil spill according to the District Court).
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ment is imposed is even more problematic. Determining the amount of a
punitive damages award that will deter future misconduct by the offender
and others amounts to speculation, based merely on arguments by defend-
ants who seek to minimize their liability and by plaintiffs who have an
interest in arguing for high awards.
A related question concerns the effect on deterrence of ratio caps on
punitive damages. If corporations know, as they would, about the empirical
studies showing that the median award is less than 1:1 and that the possibil-
ity of an outlier award is rare,94 would this knowledge affect their behavior
and result in extra precautionary measures? Would the evidence provided
by empirical studies increase the deterrent message or minimize it? Would a
punitive damages scheme that authorizes double or treble damages provide
sufficient deterrence, or is a greater multiple of punitive to compensatory
damages required in some cases to deter?
If compensatory damages provide sufficient deterrence, or if the deter-
rent effect of punitive damages is uncertain, an important question remains:
Should Exxon still be punished? If deterrence theory cannot pinpoint the
appropriate punitive damages award, then perhaps retribution, which bases
the amount of punishment on the degree of wrongfulness of the conduct,
will provide the answer as to the proper amount of punishment.
RETRIBUTION AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Retribution rejects the premise that there should be unlimited flexibil-
ity to fix the penalty to ensure the punishment is meaningful. Instead, retri-
bution theory assigns and measures punishment based on the degree of
wrongfulness.95 The more wrongful misconduct deserves the more severe
punishment.96 Retribution theory does not measure the amount of punish-
ment on the basis of how much pain a person feels when imprisoned or how
much pain a person or corporation feels when fined. Instead, retribution
assigns the proper amount of punishment according to the misconduct, not
the impact on the offender.97 The impact of imprisonment or a fine may be
quite different for different offenders depending on their wealth or social
connections. A small corporation with few assets may suffer more from a
$100,000 fine than a rich corporation. A homeless person with friends in
jail may not have the same reaction to jail that a person with a job and
community and family ties would. But it violates principles of notice and
94. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. at 2624 n.13 (referencing these empirical
studies).
95. See, e.g., Romero, supra note 7, at 121 (explaining the retributive notion that punishment
is deserved and that the severity of the punishment should be measured by how much punishment
is deserved). See id. at 120–24 for a discussion of the retribution basis for proportionality.
96. Id. at 120–21.
97. See, e.g., id. at 120 (“What is deserved punishment depends on the wrongfulness of the
conduct.”).
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equal punishment to ratchet up punitive damages after the fact to make sure
the punishment is felt. Just punishment does not permit punishment to be
open-ended simply to make sure it is felt.
When setting a maximum penalty for certain misconduct, a legislature
considers that a crime may be committed under different circumstances—
the same crime but with different facts and different offenders. A rational
legislature considers that there may be aggravating circumstances in some
cases and mitigating circumstances in others. With this in mind, the legisla-
ture assigns the maximum punishment for a crime based on what it consid-
ers to be the worst-case scenario. A similar approach is to punish a typical
occurrence of a crime like robbery with X years in prison, but to authorize a
sentence of X plus three years in an especially egregious case. The point is
that the legislature determines in advance the maximum punishment for a
particular crime, thus giving fair notice of the possible punishment. A
predefined maximum also ensures that similar offenses receive similar pun-
ishment and thus prevents outlier sentences. Retribution theory values the
principles of fairness in uniformity and equal treatment of like offenses.98
Even though the legislature cannot foresee all of the variants of a crime,
including those more horrendous than the typical crime it had in mind, just
punishment cannot exceed the maximum. If experience shows that the max-
imum penalty is too low, the legislature can amend the statute and prospec-
tively authorize a higher maximum.
REGULATING PUNITIVE DAMAGES TO ALLOW HIGHER AWARDS
If, like the district court and the Ninth Circuit believed, Exxon should
be punished more severely than the United States Supreme Court thought,
then Congress should step in and regulate punitive damages to authorize
awards with ratios in the 5:1 or 10:1 range, or even higher for special cases.
The Supreme Court’s proportionality jurisprudence suggests that punitive
damages need to be regulated by legislatures if punitive damages awards
are to be respected and upheld.99
In a scheme of regulated punitive damages, the Court would defer to
legislatively authorized awards with higher ratios than 1:1, 4:1, or even 9:1.
The Supreme Court has deferred to legislative schemes for criminal
sentences that permit shockingly severe punishment,100 and it is likely that
the Court would also defer to legislative schemes authorizing high punitive
98. See, e.g., Romero, supra note 7, at 121 (noting that concepts of fairness in the retribution
theory support both uniform, or least similar, punishment for similar offenders and differential
punishment for dissimilar offenders).
99. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 7, at 7 (“Court’s insistence that punishment be regularized
puts a premium on legislative involvement in authorizing and regulating punitive damages.”).
100. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (upholding a twenty-five years to
life sentence for stealing three golf clubs under the California three-strikes law stating that “select-
ing the sentencing rationales is generally a policy choice to be made by state legislatures, not
federal courts.”).
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damages awards.101 “If Congress passed a law permitting punitive damages
up to five times the underlying compensatory damages in maritime cases of
corporately enabled drunk driving, it is hard to imagine the Court overrid-
ing that assessment.”102
The Supreme Court’s concerns about punitive damages awards are
similar to concerns it had about the imposition of the death penalty (before
Furman)103 and indeterminate criminal sentencing before the advent of sen-
tencing guidelines.104 Concerns about arbitrariness and unpredictability re-
garding punitive damages sound very much like the concerns expressed
about the unfettered discretion in juries to decide whether to impose the
death penalty,105 and the unfettered discretion of judges to impose
sentences within enormous ranges, which resulted in wide disparity of
sentences for the same crime.106 States responded to Furman and the
Court’s command that jury discretion regarding the death penalty must be
“suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary
and capricious action”107 by enacting statutes that require jury findings of
specified aggravating factors that distinguish those murders deserving of the
death penalty.108 To limit the wide disparity of prison sentences imposed by
judges with broad discretion, legislatures stepped in to regulate criminal
sentences by adopting sentencing guidelines or more determinate sentenc-
ing schemes.109 As a result, the Court defers almost completely to the legis-
lative judgment concerning the length of imprisonment.110
Deference to legislative judgments regarding punishment by the Su-
preme Court reflects the Court’s hesitancy to substitute its own judgment
101. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 7, at 32 (“There is no reason to think that the Court would
not be equally deferential to a state’s desire to accomplish something else through a punitive
remedy.”); Romero, supra note 7, at 158 (noting that legislative judgments as to the proper
amount of punitive damages would likely be respected by the courts).
102. Id. at 39.
103. Furman v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 238, 310 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (arguing that the
sentencing system for imposing the death penalty was “wantonly and freakishly imposed”).
104. See Fisher, supra note 7, at 16 (stating that the Court’s analysis in Exxon parallels the
critique and solution of two sentencing reforms: the move to sentencing guidelines and the judicial
imposition of procedural requirements for the imposition of the death penalty).
105. Id. at 21 (The Furman court was “expressly concerned with placing boundless discretion
in the hands of juries . . . .”).
106. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2628 (2008) (stating that the Court
found it instructive that sentencing guidelines had replaced the system of giving judges “relatively
unguided discretion to sentence within a wide range”).
107. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976)) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
108. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 7, at 21 (citing Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 971–72
(1994) (providing that aggravating circumstances “may be contained in the definition of the crime
or in a separate sentencing factor (or both)”).
109. Id. at 17 (explaining that, in 1987, Congress enacted the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to
address the problem of unguided discretion in criminal sentencing).
110. Id. at 24–25 (noting that particular criminal sentences enjoy almost absolute deference
from the Court).
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regarding proportionality of punishment for that of a democratically-elected
legislature,111 especially since these judgments are matters of policy. In-
deed, the Court has recognized that the determination of proportionality
(how serious is the misconduct, and what is the proper punishment) is a
particularly legislative function.112
To use punitive damages effectively as punishment for conduct like
the Exxon Valdez oil spill, punitive damages need to be regulated. Without
regulation, punitive damages awards—especially high awards—will always
be vulnerable to due process challenges and court-imposed limits. Regula-
tion should include, at a minimum: (1) legislative authorization of punitive
damages, (2) legislative categorization of the misconduct subject to punitive
damages, and (3) legislative assignment of allowable punitive damages.
Although legislatures could address criticisms that punitive damages
punish defendants without the protection of the procedural safeguards in
criminal cases113 and regulate the procedures by which punitive damages
are awarded, a discussion of procedural protections114 is beyond the scope
of this article. Regulation of the procedural aspects of punitive damages is
not necessary in order to achieve judicial deference to punitive damages
awards.115 It is the absence of positive law regarding the authority to im-
pose punitive damages in civil cases and the absence of limits on such pun-
ishment that needs to be addressed if the Supreme Court is to treat punitive
damages with the same deference that it accords to criminal sentences.116
Moreover, other commentators have addressed the subject of procedural
safeguards for punitive damages.117
111. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28 (2003) (stating that the Court does not sit
as a “superlegislature” to second-guess California’s policy choices in enacting the three-strike
law).
112. See, e.g., id. at 28 (legislatures have the “primary responsibility for making the difficult
policy choices that underlie any criminal sentencing scheme”).
113. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Grass, The Penal Dimensions of Punitive Damages, 12 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 241, 242–43 (1985) (arguing that a determination that punitive damages are penal
should require criminal procedure safeguards); Malcom E. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for
Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269, 276–77 (1983).
114. See, e.g., Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 7, at 252 (noting that the Court has
not extended civil defendants any of the procedural protections available in the criminal context).
Professor Markel lists the following rights that defendants in punitive damages cases lack: (1) no
right to bifurcated proceeding for liability and punitive damages, (2) no right against vicarious
liability, (3) no right against double jeopardy, (4) no right to counsel, (5) no right to a proof
beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof, (6) no right against self incrimination, and (7) no
right to a trial court’s specification of reasons for upholding or remitting a punitive damages
award. Id.
115. See Fisher, supra note 7, at 41 (suggesting that not much detailed legislative regulation is
required to trigger judicial deference and that “legislatures need only enact some kind of cap for
punitive damages in tort cases”).
116. Id. at 25 (suggesting that legislation of positive law articulating the penal policies under-
lying punitive damages and establishing quantified levels of allowable awards should command
the respect of the Supreme Court).
117. See, e.g., Markel, Punitive Damages, supra note 7 (proposing detailed procedural protec-
tions for retributive punitive damages). Professor Markel proposes heightened procedural safe-
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Legislative Authorization of Punitive Damages
In a democratic society, punishment must be authorized in the form of
legislative enactment, reflecting society’s judgments regarding what con-
duct to punish and the proper amount of punishment for particular miscon-
duct.118 Legislatures make these judgments for criminal punishment in
criminal codes that reflect society’s sense about the proportionality of crim-
inal sanctions.119 Punitive damages, on the other hand, have generally been
the product of common law judicial development.120 Punitive damages in
the majority of states punish defendants and reward civil plaintiffs121 with-
out legislative authorization, without a societal judgment about proportion-
ality, and without limits.122 Instead, determining the proper amount of
punitive damages is left to juries. Individual jury awards, however, do not
reflect societal judgments in the way that democratically-elected representa-
guards for defendants facing what he calls retributive punitive damages, damages that have no
purpose but punishment. Because he views retributive damages as an intermediate sanction be-
tween criminal punishment and deterrence damages, he proposes an intermediate level of procedu-
ral safeguards. Id. at 1423. He states that “many of the same concerns of error and abuse that
motivate procedural safeguards in the criminal context also arise in the punitive damages context,
though to a lesser extent because the consequences are less condemnatory and severe.” Id. at
1435. The intermediate procedures he proposes for retributive punitive damages include: (1) clear
and convincing standard of proof, (2) a de novo standard of appellate review of the reprehensibil-
ity finding, but deference review as to other findings, (3) trial by jury, (4) right to a super majority
verdict, (5) right to bifurcate the liability and damages issues, (6) rights to confront witnesses and
present a defense, (7) no right to counsel, (8) no right against self incrimination, (9) right to avoid
punitive damages after a criminal conviction for the same conduct, and (10) no right to avoid
criminal punishment after suffering punitive damages. Id. at 1436–60.
118. See Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 7, at 263 (explaining that the state must
play a central role in authorizing and regulating punishment based on misconduct that not only
offends the victim but also the state); Fisher, supra note 7, at 26–28.
119. The Supreme Court sees legislatures as having the “primary responsibility for making the
difficult policy choices that underlie any criminal sentencing scheme.” Ewing v. California, 538
U.S. 11, 28 (2003).
120. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2620 (2008) (noting that puni-
tive damages were a common law innovation).
121. The allocation of punitive damages to the plaintiff, rather than the state, has been the
subject of criticism. Large awards are seen as windfalls for the plaintiff who has been compen-
sated for his losses. For a recent critique of the prevalent practice of awarding punitive damages to
the plaintiff and a proposal to split the award with the state, see Markel, Retributive Damages,
supra note 7, at 302–04 (proposing that the state should capture the bulk of the award, saying it is
“wrong-headed to award plaintiffs the bulk of retributive damages”). Professor Markel would
permit plaintiffs to receive from the award a “state determined flat award” as an incentive for
bringing the suit to the public’s attention. Markel, Punitive Damages, supra note 7, at 1402 (sug-
gesting a fixed award in the amount of $10,000). In addition, Professor Markel proposes that
plaintiffs be awarded attorneys’ fees for the extra labor in pursuing the punitive damages claim.
Id.
122. Apart from the six states that do not permit punitive damages and the nineteen states with
statutory caps on the amount of punitive damages that can be awarded, the remaining states permit
juries to determine the amount of punitive damages without limit. See Michael L. Rustad, The
Closing of Punitive Damages’ Iron Cage, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1297, 1339–46 (2005) (including
a useful chart listing the states with caps on punitive damages).
\\server05\productn\U\UST\7-1\UST108.txt unknown Seq: 21 30-APR-10 5:58
174 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7:1
tives do.123 In reality, juries apply the law given to them in instructions
provided by the parties, not from a legislature.124 In determining what the
proper amount of punishment is deserved by different misconduct, juries do
not bring to their task the same considerations that legislatures do.125 Jury
verdicts are ad hoc decisions based on the particular facts presented in the
case. Juries do not know other awards for similar wrongdoing and, there-
fore, cannot compare their awards to them. Juries cannot compare the mis-
conduct before them with other types of misconduct in order to assess
whether the misconduct is especially egregious and deserving of greater
punishment. They are not provided evidence of other cases or other awards
for similar misconduct when deciding whether the misconduct is particu-
larly deserving of a high award.126 Legislatures, on the other hand, do con-
sider and compare a range of misconduct that deserves punishment and
assign different degrees of punishment according to the degree of wrongful-
ness. Criminal codes are products of this process.
Legislative Categorization of Conduct Subject to Punitive Damages and
Ranking of Allowable Punitive Damages
To justify high punitive damages in the range of a ratio of 5:1 or
higher, a legislature would need to establish categories of punishable con-
duct, rank them in a hierarchy of wrongfulness, and specify the maximum
ratio of punitive damages for each category.127 Criminal codes provide an
example of this approach by punishing intentional homicides more severely
than unintentional deaths, punishing crimes against the person more se-
verely than property crimes, and subjecting repeat offenders to sentence
enhancements. There is no reason that tortious conduct cannot be catego-
rized and ranked just as criminal conduct is.128 One could, for example,
authorize a 1:1 maximum ratio for reckless conduct, 3:1 for knowing mis-
conduct, and 5:1 for intentional wrongs. Or one could authorize a baseline
ratio of 3:1 for misconduct causing economic harm, a higher ratio of 5:1 for
123. See, e.g., Romero supra note 7, at 155 (arguing that a jury award does not reflect a broad
community judgment about the wrongfulness of the conduct, or of the proper amount of
punishment).
124. See Fisher, supra note 7, at 30 (“. . . the ‘law’ in the Exxon jury instructions came from
the court and the parties, not from Congress.”).
125. See Romero, supra note 7, at 155.
126. See Fisher, supra note 7, at 21 (“[J]uries generally are unable (at least without any legal
guidance) to compare a case they are seeing to others like it and to decide whether a set of facts is
particularly egregious.”).
127. See, e.g., Romero, supra note 7, at 157–58 (proposing that legislatures use the criminal
code model and impose different caps for different types of misconduct); Fisher, supra note 7, at
42 (proposing that legislatures specify maximum ratios with respect to more finely grained catego-
ries of misconduct).
128. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 7, at 42 (arguing that one can imagine various kinds of
aggravating and mitigating factors of tortious conduct, just as in criminal law).
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harm to the environment, and an even higher ratio of 10:1 for harm to
people.
An alternative approach to the criminal code model would be to bor-
row from the Supreme Court’s death penalty jurisprudence. Legislatures
could specify aggravating and mitigating factors to guide juries in determin-
ing the amount of punitive damages within the maximum.129 Another ap-
proach would establish a presumptive punishment for the misconduct and
authorize juries to depart from the presumptive award by a multiple of two
or three depending on the presence or absence of aggravating or mitigating
factors specified by statute.130
The Supreme Court’s insistence that punishment be regularized puts a
premium on legislative involvement in authorizing, regulating, and limiting
punitive damages. By regulating punitive damages, the objections to unfet-
tered discretion, arbitrariness, and unpredictable awards would be
answered.
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
Criminal sanctions also remain available to punish and deter wrongful
conduct that harms the environment.131 Congress and various states have
enacted statutes imposing criminal liability for conduct causing harm to the
environment. Some of these laws existed at the time of the Exxon Valdez oil
spill and were enforced against Exxon and the captain of its oil tanker. The
United States prosecuted Exxon for criminal violations of the Clean Water
Act,132 the Refuse Act of 1899,133 the Migratory Bird Treaty Act,134 the
Ports and Waterways Safety Act,135 and the Dangerous Cargo Act.136 Ex-
129. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 7, at 42 (proposing that legislatures provide lists of aggravat-
ing and mitigating factors to guide juries respecting permissible amounts of punitive damages and
to require juries to find aggravating factors before imposing punitive damages above otherwise
presumptive thresholds).
130. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-18-15–15.1 (2009 Cumulative Supp.) (providing a ba-
sic sentence for different felony classifications and permitting the judge to alter the basic sentence
by increasing it up to one-third or decreasing it by more than one-third, depending on the proof of
aggravating or mitigating circumstances).
131. There is a debate concerning the propriety of punishing a defendant both criminally and
with punitive damages for the same conduct. Double punishment for the same conduct raises
many of the same concerns that underlie the Double Jeopardy Clause although the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause does not apply to civil litigation between private parties. See Markel, Punitive Dam-
ages, supra note 7, at 1450–60 (proposing that punitive damages would not preclude a later
criminal prosecution, but a criminal conviction would preclude a later action for punitive dam-
ages). This position is similar to that adopted by the Australian High Court in Gray v. Motor
Accidents Commission (1998) 196 C.L.R. 1. For a discussion of the implications of this decision,
see Tyrone Kirchengast, The Purification of Torts, the Consolidation of Criminal Law and the
Decline of Victim Power, 10 U. NOTRE DAME AUSTL. L. REV. 85 (2008).
132. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1319(c)(1) (2006).
133. Refuse Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 407, 411 (2006).
134. Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703, 707(a) (2006).
135. Ports and Waterways Safety Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1232(b)(1) (2006).
136. Dangerous Cargo Act, 46 U.S.C. § 3718(b) (2006).
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xon pleaded guilty to violations of the Clean Water Act, the Refuse Act,
and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, and agreed to a total fine of $150 mil-
lion.137 This fine was later reduced to $25 million plus restitution of $100
million.138 Each of these statutes authorizes imprisonment as well as fines.
Under the Clean Water Act, for example, negligent violations carry a maxi-
mum prison term of one year for the first violation and up to two years for
subsequent violations.139 Knowing violations carry a prison penalty up to
three years for the first offense and up to six years for subsequent
convictions.140
Each of the environmental crimes listed above applies to individuals as
well as corporations.141 Although criminal liability for corporations has its
critics,142 the concept of corporate criminal liability has been accepted by
the Supreme Court143 and is now an established feature of criminal law in
general and of environmental crime in particular.144 Of course, corporations
137. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2613 (2008).
138. Id.
139. 33 U.S.C § 1319 (c)(1)(B) (2006).
140. 33 U.S.C § 1319 (c)(2)(B). The Refuse Act designates unlawful discharges into naviga-
ble waters as a misdemeanor and authorizes imprisonment for a term from thirty days to one year.
33 U.S.C. § 411 (2006). Taking or killing migratory birds in violation of the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act amounts to a misdemeanor subject to imprisonment up to six months. 16 U.S.C.
§ 707(a) (2006). Violations of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act and the Dangerous Cargo Act
are classified as Class D felonies subject to imprisonment between five and ten years. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1232(b)(1), 46 U.S.C. § 3718(b). Class D felonies carry a penalty of imprisonment for more
than five years and no more than 10 years. 18 U.S.C. § 3359(a)(4) (2006). Both of these statutes
were amended the year after the Exxon Valdez oil spill to classify violations of the statutes as
Class D felonies, changing the previous penalty of a $50,000 fine and maximum five years in
prison. Pub. L. No. 101-380 §§ 4302(c)(1), (j)(1), 104 Stat. 484 (1990).
141. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(7) (person defined to include an individ-
ual or a corporation); Dangerous Cargo Act, 46 U.S.C. § 3701(4) (person defined to mean an
individual or a corporation).
142. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think about the Punishment of Corporations
1 (Northwestern University School of Law Public Law and Legal Theory Series, No. 09–19,
2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1491263## (arguing that
corporate criminal punishment is a mistake because it punishes innocent shareholders); KATHLEEN
F. BRICKEY, ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME: LAW, POLICY, PROSECUTION 90 (2008) (noting that although
the rules underlying corporate criminal liability are well-settled, corporate criminal responsibility
still provokes controversy); J. KELLY STRADER, UNDERSTANDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME 17
(2002).
143. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
144. See, e.g., BRICKEY, supra note 142, at 89 (practice of prosecuting corporate entities ap-
pears to be more prevalent in environmental crime cases); ELLEN S. PODGOR & JEROLD H. ISRAEL,
WHITE COLLAR CRIME IN A NUTSHELL 16–19 (2009) (“Corporate criminal liability has recently
played a significant role in the prosecution of environmental crimes.”). For a fuller discussion of
the use of the criminal sanction to enforce environmental laws, see Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting
the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental
Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407, 2413 (1995) [hereinafter Lazarus, Reforming Environmental
Criminal Law] (proposing how environmental criminal law should be reformed to be an effective
enforcement tool); Richard J. Lazarus, Mens Rea in Environmental Criminal Law: Reading Su-
preme Court Tea Leaves, 7 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 861, 864–72 (1996) [hereinafter Lazarus, Mens
Rea in Environmental Criminal Law].
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can only be subjected to criminal fines, but individual corporate employees
can be sentenced to prison and fined.
Criminal sanctions can be imposed on the culpable actor. Indeed, the
State of Alaska prosecuted Captain Hazelwood for violation of several
Alaska statutes prohibiting “reckless endangerment, operating a watercraft
while intoxicated, and negligent discharge of oil.”145 At trial on these
charges, a jury convicted him of violating only the Alaska statute that made
it unlawful to negligently discharge petroleum upon the water or land of the
state—a misdemeanor.146 The trial judge sentenced him to 90 days in jail
and a $1,000 fine, or in the alternative, to perform 1000 hours of commu-
nity service.147 Both the conviction and sentence were affirmed by the
Alaska Court of Appeals.148
The federal government, however, did not prosecute either Captain
Hazelwood or any Exxon employees for violations of federal environmental
crimes even though the penalty provisions in these statutes apply to both
individuals and corporations.149 Although Exxon corporation violated these
statutes, as it admitted in its guilty plea,150 Exxon’s commission of these
crimes was based on conduct or omissions by employees acting on behalf
of the corporation. A corporation can only act through its employees. The
conduct of Captain Hazelwood in piloting an oil tanker while intoxicated
most likely violated the Clean Water Act’s criminal provision prohibiting
the negligent discharge of oil into navigable waters.151 Some Exxon execu-
tives also likely violated the Clean Water Act based on findings that Ex-
xon’s executives had knowledge of Hazelwood’s drinking history and his
relapse before putting him in charge of the Exxon Valdez.152 These findings
support culpability—either a reckless or a negligent discharge of oil—on
the part of the Exxon executives.153 Those officers who recklessly or negli-
145. Hazelwood v. State, 836 P.2d 943, 945 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
146. Hazelwood v. State, 962 P.2d 196, 201 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 202.
149. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(7) (2006) (person defined to include an
individual or a corporation); Dangerous Cargo Act, 46 U.S.C. § 3701(4) (2006) (person defined to
mean an individual or a corporation).
150. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2613 (2008) (noting that Exxon pled
guilty to violation of the Clean Water Act, the Refuse Act, and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act).
151. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3) prohibits the discharge of any pollutants into navigable waters of
the United States and adjoining shorelines.
152. See In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1237–38 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Exxon knew Hazel-
wood was an alcoholic, knew that he had failed to maintain his treatment regimen and had re-
sumed drinking, knew that he was going on board to command its supertankers after drinking, yet
let him continue to command the Exxon Valdez through the icy and treacherous waters of Prince
William Sound.”); In re Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1097 (D. Alaska 2004) (“Exxon
willfully allowed Captain Hazelwood to continue to operate a supertanker filled with crude oil
despite Exxon’s knowledge that he was drinking again.”).
153. These executives were reckless if they were aware of the risk of an accident and oil spill
and consciously disregarded it; but even if they were unaware of the risk, they were negligent in
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gently ordered or permitted Captain Hazelwood to pilot the oil tanker would
be liable under the Clean Water Act for a criminal violation subject to a
sentence of imprisonment up to one year.154 Furthermore, any corporate
officer who knew that Captain Hazelwood was intoxicated when he took
charge of the tanker could be imprisoned up to three years for a knowing
violation.155
Criminal liability may even extend to corporate officers, including
high-level executives who control corporate policies, whose participation in
the violation is less direct. Under the ‘responsible corporate officer’ doc-
trine, corporate employees who have a ‘responsible relationship to’ or a
‘responsible share of’ the violation can be criminally liable.156 This theory
of liability applies to any corporate executive who “by reason of his posi-
tion in the corporation, [had] responsibility and authority either to prevent
in the first instance, or promptly to correct, the violation complained of,
and . . . failed to do so.”157 In addition to lower-level corporate officers with
direct responsibility for the activities that led to the criminal violation, the
chief executive officer of the corporation,158 and perhaps some members of
the board of directors,159 might be liable under this standard.
The ‘responsible corporate officer’ doctrine has been applied to envi-
ronmental crimes. Indeed, the Clean Water Act includes a ‘responsible cor-
porate officer’ in its definition of ‘person’ subject to criminal liability.160
Furthermore, courts have used the doctrine in upholding criminal liability
for high-level executives. The Fourth Circuit has applied the doctrine in a
Clean Water Act prosecution,161 and state courts have used it in enforcing
state environmental statutes.162
the sense that they should have known about the risk of relapse and the risk of a serious accident
by a drunken ship pilot.
154. 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (c)(1).
155. 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (c)(2).
156. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United States v. Park, 421 U.S.
658 (1975). In both cases the Court held that a president of a corporation could be found guilty of
a misdemeanor violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 52 Stat. 1042. In Dot-
terweich, the Court noted that the statute dispensed with any mens rea requirement and imposed
liability on any officer ‘otherwise innocent’ who stood ‘in responsible relation’ to a violation of
the Act. 320 U.S. at 281. The Court in Park refined the responsible relation test by adding that
criminal liability extends to those officers who have ‘a responsible share of’ the violation. 421
U.S. at 672–74.
157. Park, 421 U.S. at 673–74.
158. The responsible corporate officer doctrine was applied to the president of the corporation
in Dotterweich and the chief executive officer in Park.
159. For an illuminating discussion on the application of the responsible corporate officer
doctrine to directors, see Erik Gerding, United States of America, in DIRECTOR’S PERSONAL LIA-
BILITY FOR CORPORATE FAULT, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 301, 313–18 (Helen Anderson ed.,
2008).
160. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(6).
161. United States v. Ming Hong, 242 F.3d 528, 531 (4th Cir. 2001).
162. For decisions applying the doctrine in water pollution cases, see, for example, State Dep’t
of Envtl. Prot. v. Standard Tank Cleaning Corp., 284 N.J. Super. 381 (App. Div. 1995); BEC
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Courts are reluctant, however, to apply this doctrine where there is no
explicit congressional intent to include this type of liability or where the
corporate officer has little or no culpability for the criminal violation.163
Concerned that this doctrine imposes vicarious criminal liability, the Su-
preme Court has suggested that the responsible corporate officer doctrine
should be limited to statutes that specifically authorize it.164 Even when a
statute explicitly makes a responsible corporate officer subject to criminal
liability,165 lower federal courts have restricted the reach of the doctrine to
those officers with direct oversight of the corporate activity that led to the
criminal violation.166 Courts are even more reluctant to rely on the doctrine
when the criminal statute requires a ‘knowing’ mens rea.167 Under this re-
strictive view, a high-ranking officer with general authority over many op-
erations of the corporation may not qualify as a responsible corporate
officer. Only those officers who have been delegated direct responsibility
for the activity would meet this restrictive criterion for application of the
doctrine. Senior level executives who had no direct responsibility but who
were aware of the violation or had knowledge of facts that should have
alerted them to the risk of a violation, however, could still be liable based
on their personal culpability.
Criminal punishment of senior executives who control corporate poli-
cies makes deterrence more effective in the sense that deterring the individ-
uals with the power to change corporate behavior is tantamount to deterring
the corporation. If Captain Hazelwood and the responsible Exxon execu-
tives had been prosecuted and convicted of negligently discharging oil into
Corp. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 256 Conn. 602 (2001); State Dep’t of Ecology v. Lundgren, 94
Wash. App. 236 (Div. 2 1999). For decisions applying the doctrine in waste disposal cases, see,
for example, Comm’r, Dept. of Envtl. Mgmt. v. RLG, Inc., 755 N.E.2d 556 (Ind. 2001); In Matter
of Dougherty, 482 N.W.2d 485 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); People v. Matthews, 7 Ca. App. 4th 1052
(2d Dist. 1992).
163. See, e.g., Celentano v. Rocque, 282 Conn. 645, 671 (2007) (explaining that the strict
liability feature of the responsible corporate officer doctrine applies only to a narrow class of
‘public welfare’ statutes). The responsible corporate officer doctrine, to the extent that it imposes
strict liability, is inconsistent with the general principle of criminal law that liability should be
premised on personal culpability. A senior executive like the chief operating officer, who is re-
sponsible for the general operation of the corporation, but who has delegated responsibility for a
particular operation, may have had no knowledge of a violation, but under the doctrine could be
liable.
164. Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 287–89 (2003) (rejecting a request to impose liability on
the president of a real estate corporation for an employee’s violation, characterizing the Dot-
terweich rule as unusually strict and a non-traditional rule of vicarious liability that would be
applied only when Congress has specified its intent to apply it).
165. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(6).
166. See, e.g., J. KELLY STRADER, UNDERSTANDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME § 2.07(b) (2002);
Harry First, General Principles Governing the Criminal Liability of Corporations, Their Employ-
ees and Officers, in WHITE COLLAR CRIME: BUSINESS AND REGULATORY OFFENSES § 5.04(2)
(Otto G. Obermaier & Robert G. Morvillo eds., 1998).
167. See, e.g., United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35, 51–52 (1st
Cir. 1991) (explaining that the responsible corporate officer doctrine could not circumvent the
explicit ‘knowing’ requirement for criminal liability under the hazardous waste disposal statute).
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the waters of Prince William Sound in violation of the Clean Water Act,
they could have been sentenced to a prison term of up to one year.168 This
sanction was not pursued against culpable individuals in the Exxon case. If
sentenced to prison, corporate executives bear the full measure of the pun-
ishment. Unlike fines or punitive damages, which executives can get the
corporation to pay, the executive cannot delegate to the corporation or a
subordinate to serve his prison sentence. Punishment in the form of a crimi-
nal sentence to a prison term has more of the feel of retribution and proba-
bly more of a deterrent effect.169
One might ask whether punishing misconduct involving environmental
harm with a criminal conviction and sentence offers any advantage over
punitive damages170 in view of the fact that a criminal prosecution brings
into play criminal procedural protections. The answer to this question de-
pends on the degree of culpability involved in the conduct171 and the need
to punish the transgressor. For intentionally or knowingly causing harm, a
criminal conviction makes a stronger statement about the moral quality of
the conduct than a punitive damages award.172 It expresses the moral culpa-
bility of the conduct and conveys a stigma that reflects the retributive no-
tion of just desserts. In addition, the criminal sanction, especially
imprisonment, sends a much stronger deterrent message about the costs of
committing environmental crimes.173 Criminal sanctions, therefore, have a
greater potential to deter future environmental violations than do punitive
damages.174 A punitive damages award obtained by a private party in a civil
action also punishes the defendant, but the stigma of a civil award is less,
and the message seems to be more about money than punishment. Both
criminal sanctions and punitive damages are available to punish culpable
168. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1).
169. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 7, at 40 (“Just ask an independent businessperson whether
she would rather spend years in prison or dole out a large chunk of her corporation’s cash
reserves.”).
170. See BRICKEY, supra note 142, at 17–24 for a discussion of the merits of criminal enforce-
ment of environmental laws.
171. See, e.g., Lazarus, Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, supra note 144, at 2511 (ar-
guing that environmental crimes should involve the kind of morally culpable behavior warranting
felony sanctions such as knowing violations). Professor Lazarus argues that the criminal sanction
should be employed only when there is moral culpability. Id. at 2529 (noting the right not to be
incarcerated in the absence of moral culpability).
172. See, e.g., Lazarus, Mens Rea in Environmental Crime, supra note 144, at 864 (“[T]he
imposition of a criminal sanction makes an important symbolic statement regarding the moral
culpability of the transgressor . . . it is not merely unlawful—it is criminal in character.”).
173. A criminal fine, like a punitive damages award, must be sufficiently severe in order to
deter. Otherwise, the fine may be considered just another cost of doing business. See BRICKEY
supra note 142, at 16 (explaining that the risk of corporations considering a fine as a cost of doing
business is “especially true in the context of environmental regulation, where the costs of compli-
ance can easily exceed an ordinary criminal fine”).
174. Lazarus, Mens Rea in Environmental Criminal Law, supra note 144, at 867 (noting that
criminal sanctions have the unique ability to deter violations, and “the threat of personal criminal
penalty can prompt far greater compliance by industry than mere civil sanctions”).
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defendants. Criminal sanctions should be used to punish especially culpable
misconduct, like purposeful or knowing violations. Criminal prosecution
may be too punitive in cases involving less culpable violations, and punitive
damages should be sufficient to punish such conduct. For the most culpable
misconduct, a defendant may be punished by both punitive damages and
criminal penalties.
CONCLUSION
Both the type and amount of punishment need to be taken into consid-
eration when punishing environmental misconduct. When the conduct is
subject to both criminal sanctions and punitive damages, the type of punish-
ment that is most appropriate in a particular case depends on the culpability
of the conduct and the nature of the harm as well as the need for deterrence
and retribution. In some cases, the reality of imprisonment of corporate offi-
cials may prove to be the best deterrence and the best method to effectively
express the moral outrage occasioned by the misconduct. In other cases, a
very large punitive damages award may spur executives, board members,
and shareholders into making changes that will prevent future misconduct.
In some cases, the defendant’s conduct may deserve both criminal punish-
ment and punitive damages. The availability of high award punitive dam-
ages greater than a 1:1 ratio to compensatory damages, however, will
require legislative regulation that categorizes the misconduct subject to pu-
nitive damages, assigns the maximum amount of allowable damages for
different types of misconduct, and authorizes high awards for particularly
reprehensible conduct.
